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Abstract 
Secure behavior, defined as users’ compliance with their organization’s password 
policy, is critical for sustaining a profitable and operational organization. Training that 
provides security arguments and promotes systematic cognitive processing has been 
shown to be an effective mechanism for improving secure behavior. Training by 
providing security cues, on the other hand, has been criticized as having a short-lived 
and unpredictable influence on secure behavior. This paper challenges this criticism by 
explaining how security cues influence secure behavior and when they are more 
effective in influencing secure behavior than security arguments. We hypothesize the 
different theoretical mechanisms through which security arguments and security cues 
influence secure behavior. We further hypothesize that when users’ attitude toward 
behaving secure is poor, security arguments should be used. However, when users’ 
attitude toward behaving secure is positive, security cues should be used. This paper 
suggests how to test our proposed hypotheses in an experimental setting. 
Keywords: Information security, training, reminders, cues, arguments, elaboration likelihood 
model, cognitive load theory, theory of planned behavior 
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Introduction 
Users are often referred to as the weakest link in information systems security (Boss et al. 2009). 
Estimates indicate that the average IT security breach costs organizations over three million dollars 
(Wilkinson 2011), and most security compromises and exploits are a result of users’ ignorance and 
negligence to their organization’s security policy (Adams and Sasse 1999; Davies and Price 1989). Secure 
behavior is defined as users’ compliance with their organization’s security policy (Jenkins et al. 2010). In 
this paper, we specifically focus on users’ compliance with the organization’s password policy such as 
creating strong passwords, logging out of computers, not reusing passwords, not writing down passwords, 
and not giving other people your password. Insecure behavior can have financial and legal consequences 
(Goel and Shawky 2009). 
Changing users’ secure behavior can be accomplished through security training and education 
(Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). Training can take many forms including training sessions (Straub and 
Welke 1998), videos, handouts (Murray 1991), screen savers (Rudolph et al. 2002), or even video games 
(Cone et al. 2007). Training has been theoretically linked to improving secure behavior by changing 
people’s perceptions about or attitudes toward security or risk (Goodhue and Straub 1991; Puhakainen 
and Siponen 2010; Siponen 2000; Straub and Welke 1998). Training has been suggested to be most 
effective in changing attitude and behavior when it is thought-provoking or motivates learners to engage 
in systematic cognitive processing. This is done through security argumentation (Puhakainen and 
Siponen 2010). On the other hand, training that promotes non-systematic cognitive processing, known as 
peripheral cognitive processing (non-thought provoking), has been discouraged in past literature as it 
may cause “short-lived and unpredictable” attitude changes of security (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010, 
pg. 762). Peripheral cognitive processing can be accomplished through administering cues about security 
to the user.  
Contrary to previous literature, we propose that training that invokes peripheral processing (non-thought-
provoking processing) can improve secure behavior and, in some situations, be more effective in 
improving secure behavior than training that invokes systematic cognitive processing.  To make this 
argument, we suggest a theoretical framework that explains secure behavior is influenced by two factors—
users’ attitude towards security and the cognitive load required to behave securely. Whereas training that 
invokes systematic processing can effectively change one’s attitude toward security, training that invokes 
peripheral processing can augment human cognition and reduce cognitive load. In summary, we will 
answer the following research question: Under what circumstances do different types of security 
training (argumentation vs. cues) yield higher compliance with a password policy?  
This article proceeds as follows. Based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model of persuasion, we discuss 
previous literature suggesting training that promotes systematic processing is the most effective training 
technique to improve secure behavior. We then contribute to theory by explaining how training that 
supports peripheral processing can at times be more influential in promoting secure behavior through a 
different theoretical mechanism—the Cognitive Load Theory. Finally, we suggest how our hypotheses can 
be tested and suggest theoretical and practical implications. 
When Cognitive Processing Matters in IS Security 
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Different types of security training will appeal to different types of cognitive processing—namely, 
systematic processing and peripheral processing—that change users’ attitudes regarding security. Both 
types of cognitive processing of security training are rooted in the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) 
(Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). ELM was first delineated by Cacioppo and Petty (1979) and has been 
extensively developed, validated, and applied to a variety of contexts (e.g., Petty et al. 2002; Petty and 
Cacioppo 1981; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; White et al. 2008). The basic premise of ELM is that persuasion 
can occur through two routes – a systematic (i.e., central) route and the peripheral route (Angst and 
Agarwal 2009; Cacioppo and Petty 1979). The systematic route is based on security arguments and 
involves deep information processing, argument scrutiny, careful thought, logic, and facts (Bhattacherjee 
and Sanford 2006). Training that promotes systematic processing encourages users to think about the 
issue of being secure. For example, a training video can be implemented that argues the importance of 
being secure, such as encrypting emails, and provide anecdotal evidence or personalized results to make 
users think about why security is important (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). As another example, 
security training sessions can be conducted that encourage discussion among learners and instructors 
(Hung 2001).  If the result of the elaboration process is positive, it results in persuasion; otherwise, 
elaboration will undermine persuasion (Kim and Benbasat 2003).  
The peripheral route involves less cognitive load and relies on cues and heuristics to make a judgment 
(Bhattacherjee and Sanford 2006). Security cues refer to non-argument elements of the message that can 
influence a change in attitude without users having to actively think about the issue of security. Security 
cues tend to focus away from particular direct argumentation of security (Petty and Cacioppo 1981; 
Puhakainen and Siponen 2010).  For example, a desktop background graphic could remind users to lock 
their workstation when leaving their computer; or, a checklist with all the elements of a secure password 
can be displayed to users when they create new passwords. Note that neither of these two training cues 
directly argues that one should change one’s attitude toward security, but rather they remind the user 
about being secure and how to be secure.   Argumentation, which requires high cognitive load to process, 
becomes nearly irrelevant as the recipient focuses on cues that foster heuristic processing (Angst and 
Agarwal 2009; Cugelman et al. 2009; Tam and Ho 2005). However, attitude change resulting from 
peripheral route processing has been shown to be short-term and unpredictable (Petty and Cacioppo 
1981). 
ELM suggests that the depth of elaboration influences which route of persuasion is utilized (Cacioppo and 
Petty 1979). Depth of elaboration refers to the amount of thoughtful information processing 
(Bhattacherjee and Sanford 2006) and can be manipulated by choice of security training material 
(Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). When elaboration is high, one engages in a central route to persuasion; 
when elaboration is low, one engages in a peripheral route to persuasion.  On an individual level, the level 
of elaboration is influenced by motivation and ability. Motivation is the desire to process the message and 
is affected by accountability, personal relevance of the message, and need for cognition (Petty et al. 2002). 
The more motivated an individual is, the more likely one will engage in higher elaboration. Ability is the 
capacity to critically evaluate the merits of a persuasive message and is affected by time pressure, the 
possession of relevant knowledge, etc. (Petty et al. 2002). If ability is relatively low, individuals conserve 
cognitive effort and rely on simple heuristics rather than engaging in high elaboration  (White et al. 
2008). Thus, it is important to control for depth of elaboration when utilizing ELM as a theoretical bases.  
ELM research has demonstrated that the central and peripheral routes to persuasion are not entirely 
independent. The use of one route will simply attenuate the effects from engaging in the second route, and 
will not preclude the other route entirely (Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994). Furthermore, in the case of 
moderate motivation and moderate ability, a recipient may engage in both peripheral and central 
processing (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  
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When considering how security training influences secure behavior from an ELM perspective, we concur 
with previous literature (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010) that training containing persuasive arguments 
will cause a positive and persistent attitude change regarding security. Training in the form of security 
cues will also change users’ attitude regarding security, but to a lesser magnitude and to a less predictable 
extant than security arguments. The degree of elaboration likelihood determined by the type of training 
and user characteristics will help determine if a peripheral or systematic processing will be used. In 
summary, we replicate the following hypotheses: 
H1. Security arguments will improve security attitude. 
H2. Security cues will improve security attitude. 
Augmenting Cognitive Limitations 
Departing from predictions of past literature, we propose that attitude change is not the sole outcome of 
training because training will also influence cognitive load, which influences secure behavior (Jenkins et 
al. 2010). Although users of a system might have positive attitudes toward security, they may not have the 
ability to learn or remember complicated security policies. Hence, users may not behave securely despite 
having positive attitudes toward security. Training cues can help alleviate this discrepancy by providing 
reminders of security policies precisely at times when security decisions are to be made.  
The logic for this discrepancy between attitude and secure behavior can be explained through Cognitive 
Load Theory. Cognitive Load Theory (CLT) originates from cognitive psychology and begins by explaining 
the inherent limitations of concurrent working memory load (Sweller 1988). Humans are limited in the 
amount of information they can hold in their working memory and the number of operations they can 
perform on this information. Cognitive load may vary depending on the intrinsic, extraneous, and 
germane demands. Intrinsic cognitive load refers to the inherent level of difficulty associated with a 
learning task. For example, creating a secure password with 15 characters, upper and lower case letters, 
numbers, and special characters is a more difficult task than locking a computer when leaving your 
workstation. Extraneous cognitive load refers to the cognitive environmental strains surrounding a 
learning task. For example, when users are prompted to create a new password, they might have other 
issues on their mind such as the pressure of meeting a deadline or the progression of a current project or 
goal. Extraneous cognitive load is prevalent in work-settings and reduces the amount of working memory 
available to complete or even recall a security task, such as the requirements of a secure password. 
Germane cognitive load refers to the load devoted to processing, construction, and automation of schemas 
to learn new information. For example, a security cue might provide a schema, such as a passphrase 
strategy, to remember complex passwords. Germane cognitive load is often desired whereas extraneous 
cognitive load is often not. 
Security arguments cause users to think and cognitively process arguments (Puhakainen and Siponen 
2010). ELM supports this by explaining that arguments influence individuals’ attitudes when elaboration 
likelihood is high (Petty and Cacioppo 1981). When elaboration likelihood is high, users engage in careful 
thought, logical deduction, and argument scrutiny (Bhattacherjee and Sanford 2006).  When cognitive 
resources are expended to process security arguments, cognitive load is increased and users will have less 
cognitive ability to accomplish the security task at hand and thus increase extraneous cognitive load. In 
summary, we predict, 
H3. Security arguments increase cognitive load. 
Complex security policies can have high internal cognitive load. For example, having to recall the criteria 
for creating a strong password, create the password, and then commit the password to memory can be 
very difficult for humans (Adams and Sasse 1999). Security cues can augment this process by providing 
reminders on how to be secure precisely when users create passwords or perform other security activities. 
This eliminates the need for users to recall, or commit to memory, every requirement of a secure act (e.g., 
15 characters, upper and lower case letter, numbers, special characters, etc. for passwords), thus 
decreasing intrinsic cognitive load. Furthermore, security cues should decrease extraneous cognitive load. 
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Working memory is limited and cognitions compete for attention (Sweller 1988). Security is most often a 
secondary objective of using a system (i.e., users do not use computers for the mere enjoyment of 
behaving securely). Thus, security must compete with projects, time constraints, deadlines, work tasks, 
and even intrinsic computing activities. With a limited working memory, it is possible that users will 
simply forget about behaving securely albeit having good intentions. Security cues in the form of 
reminders can help alleviate this weakness by reminding users about being secure during busy times (e.g., 
a desktop background reminding users to logout).  Finally, security cues can increase germane cognitive 
load by providing mechanisms to facilitate cognition, such as teaching users to remember complex 
passwords by using passphrases. Note that none of these methods directly argue that security is 
important, but rather help augment users’ cognition when users are confronted with a security decision.  
H4. Security cues decrease cognitive load. 
Attitude and Cognitive Load as Mediators 
Up to this point in our research, we utilize ELM and CLT to explain how security argumentation and 
security cues influence security attitude and cognitive load. However, neither ELM nor CLT detail the 
causal process in which attitude and cognitive load influence behavior. To complete our model, we bridge 
this gap by utilizing the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) to explain how security attitude and cognitive 
load influence intentions and secure behaviors, and mediate the effect of security arguments and cues on 
intentions and secure behavior.  
TPB posits that behavioral attitude, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control influence one’s 
intention to perform a behavior (e.g., behave securely). Behavioral attitude refers to “positive or negative 
evaluation of performing the behavior” (Ajzen 1985, pg. 12); a subjective norm refers to the “Social 
pressure put on him to perform or not perform the behavior in question” (pg. 12); and behavioral control 
refers to “the degree of control a person has over internal and external factors that may interfere with the 
execution of an intended action” (pg. 35). TPB predicts that intentions influence behavior and fully 
mediate the effect of behavioral attitude and subjective norms on behavior. Intentions partially mediate 
the effect of perceived behavioral control on behavior; however, perceived behavioral control also has a 
direct relationship with behavior. Finally, TPB predicts that behavioral attitude, subjective norms, and 
behavioral control are correlated. Figure 1 summarizes TPB. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Theory of Planned Behavior 
 
Based on TPB, we predict that security attitude will positively influence intentions and ultimately secure 
behavior. To be consistent with TPB, we also predict that this attitude will mediate the effect of security 
argumentation and cues on intentions. TPB explains that external factors (such as argumentation and 
cues as suggested by ELM) can introduce new information and thereby “may influence the person’s 
attitude toward the behavior or his subjective norm and, as a result, produce a revised intention” (Ajzen 
1985, pg. 19). This delineates a clear mediating effect. Previous security research has also shown that 
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beliefs and attitude mediate the relationship between information security awareness and intentions 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010); cues and security training being one way to improve information security 
awareness if properly performed (Siponen 2000).  In summary, we propose:  
H5a. Security attitude is positively related to intentions to behave securely. 
H5b. Security attitude mediates the effects of security arguments and security cues on intentions to 
behave securely. 
We now propose that cognitive load directly influences intentions and also mediates the effect of security 
argumentation and cues on secure behavior. We also utilize TPB to support these propositions by arguing 
that cognitive load is one operationalization of perceived behavioral control that is relevant to predicting 
secure behavior. Note that we do not argue that cognitive load is the only behavioral control variable that 
influences secure behavior; however, we leave other operationalizations of behavioral control to future 
research as they are outside the scope of this study. As a reminder, perceived behavioral control refers to 
the control a person has over factors that may interfere with the behavior. These factors can include 
internal limitations of ability, skills, will power, presence of mind, and so forth. They may also include 
external factors such as time or requisite information provided (Ajzen 1985). Cognitive load is but one 
internal limitation that can interfere with performing the task of behaving securely. Cognitive load has 
been shown to be negatively related to secure behavior (Jenkins et al. 2010). The higher the cognitive 
load, the less working memory people have to devote to the task of being secure. Furthermore, people 
desire to do tasks with the least amount of effort as possible (Mann 1987). Thus, by making security tasks 
unnecessarily complex, people have a natural tendency to find an easier solution.  To reiterate, external 
factors (e.g., security argumentation and cues) can influence perceptions of behavioral control and 
thereby influence intentions in a mediated relationship. It is important to note that cognitive load is a 
negative operationalization of perceived behavioral control (cognitive load decreases attitude). In 
summary, we propose: 
H6a. Cognitive load decreases intentions to behave securely. 
H6b. Cognitive load mediates the effects of security arguments and security cues on intentions to behave 
securely.  
Finally, consistent with TPB, we hypothesize that intentions and perceived behavioral control 
(operationalized as cognitive load) will influence behavior. We also replicate TPB that predicts perceived 
behavioral control (cognitive load) and attitude are correlated. The final research model is shown on 
Figure 2. In summary, 
H7. Intentions to behave securely increases secure behavior. 
H8. Cognitive load decreases secure behavior. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Proposed Research Model 
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Proposed Methodology 
We propose testing the above hypotheses by conducting a 2 x 2 factorial experiment crossing security 
argumentation and security cues. Security argumentation will be implemented via an instructional 
training video given before the experiment describing how to follow a password policy. The password 
policy is adopted from the SANS institute (SANS 2011) and covers: creating a strong password in terms of 
length and complexity (lower and uppercase letters, special characters, and numbers), creating passwords 
that are not in dictionaries, not writing down passwords, not sharing passwords, logging out of 
computers, and using different password for different systems. Security cues will be implemented as 
reminders given during the experiment per the password policy. The reminders will include a) a desktop 
background reminding users to logout when leaving the computer b) a checklist of what entails a secure 
password presented to the user when new passwords are created and c) signs displayed as participants 
leave their workspace  that remind them not to disclose their passwords to anyone. 
An experiment utilizing students has been designed to mimic a realistic business situation. Students will 
be asked to participate in a class consulting project as a part of an experiment. The class consulting 
project involves creating and populating a real e-commerce store for a local business. The experiment 
requires users to interact with a Windows workstation, the Amazon.com Associates Web site, Google 
Apps, and one other informational Web site, all of which require a username and password. The local 
business was developed specifically for this experiment and will be disabled immediately after the 
experiment to avoid revenue gain per University policy. However, Amazon.com Associates and Google 
Apps are actually linked to the local business’ credit and bank accounts. Thus, the risk for financial loss 
for the local business is real if security is compromised. No personal or financial information will be 
collected from the participants, thus personal risk is minimal. However, to increase the personal cost of 
being non-secure during the experiment, participants will be told that to receive full credit, they are 
required to adhere to the company’s password policy given the financial risks to the company. Research 
predicts that the fear of loss has a greater personal impact than the opportunity to gain additional credit 
for participating in the experiment (Kahneman et al. 1990). This scenario mimics a real-world business in 
which potential loss for a corporation is high for a security breach and employees can expect a lesser 
relative loss (e.g., losing pay, recognition, or a job) for causing this security breach.  
Prior to the experiment, we will explain the potential risk of financial loss for the local business to the 
participants, and then give each participant a password policy adapted from the SANS institute (SANS 
2011). We will then test their comprehension of the policy using an information security policy awareness 
measure (Bulgurcu et al. 2010). Next, participants in the training treatment will watch a training video 
covering information related in the password policy while participants in the reminder group will receive 
cues on how to behave securely during the experiment as noted previously.  
Participants will then register for a lab session to complete their consulting task for the local business. 
Upon arriving at the experiment, they will be given detailed instructions on how to complete their task. 
We will also ask that participants do not interact with each other during the experiment.  They will be 
required to create a password to access their Windows work station, create a password on Google Apps, 
and create a username and password on an informational Web site to obtain resources they need to 
complete the task. Half-way through the experiment, participants will be instructed to visit the 
experiment facilitator’s desk (located away from the computer lab), to set up an Amazon.com Associates 
account under the local business’ meta-account. Participants must wait until their number is called to visit 
the desk to ensure that only one person is traveling to the desk at a time. On their walk from the 
experiment facilitator’s desk to the computer lab, an actor will approach the participant and explain that 
he is trying to complete the consulting project but cannot log into a computer. This is similar to a social 
engineering attempt at a corporation in which an employee claims that she cannot login to her computer, 
and asks a colleague to login the computer for her so she can do her work. The actor will ask the 
participant for her credentials to complete the task in a social engineering attempt. We will record a) the 
strength of the user’s passwords, b) whether or not the participant logged out of her account when leaving 
the room during and after the experiment, c) whether or not the user gave in to the social engineering 
attempt, d) and whether or not the user wrote down the password. Afterwards, participants will complete 
a post-questionnaire. A week later, we will administer a follow-up survey to participants to understand the 
longitudinal effect of security argumentation and cues on security attitude. 
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Dependent and Independent Variables 
Secure behavior will be calculated based on the participant’s compliance with a password policy adopted 
from the SANS Institute (SANS 2011). Table 1, number 6 displays how we objectively measure Secure 
Behavior. Our measure of secure behavior accounts for secure behavior on Web sites that do not have 
best-practice password restrictions (e.g., as is the case with many Web sites today including Amazon and 
Google) as well as Windows active directory that can be configured to require passwords that adhere to 
the SANS password policy. We do this by first measuring password strength in terms of length, 
complexity, and whether or not it is in a dictionary. Second, we measure other behavioral measures that 
cannot be forced via password restrictions on a computer such as whether or not participants lock their 
computer when not at their desks, whether or not they reuse passwords on different systems, whether or 
not participants give into social engineering attempts, and whether or not they write down their password. 
Table 1 also summarizes the other independent and dependent variables we measure and the variables we 
control for based on security, ELM, and TPB literature.  We will analyze our model using Structural 
Equation Modeling. 
Table 1. Construct Descriptions  
Construct Measure Description / Citation Type 
1. Security arguments  Factor represented as 1 or 0  Factor 
2. Security cues  Factor represented as 1 or 0  Binary 
3. Security attitude (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) Reflective 
4. Cognitive load NASA Task Load Index (TLI) (Hart and Staveland 1988; Tracy 
and Albers 2006)  
Formative 
5. Intentions 
(dependent variable) 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010)  Reflective 
6. Objective Measure 
of Secure behavior 
1) Password strength (average of 3 scores below): 
• Password found in common passwords, common names, 
movie characters, Russian, English, urban, French, or 
Spanish dictionary) (1 = no, 0 = yes) 
• Length of password (length/15) 
• Password has upper and lower case letters (1 point), 
numbers (1 point), special characters (1 point) ( score / 3) 
2) Password is unique among different accounts (1 = not 
duplicated, 0 = duplicated) 
3) Participant logged out of computer when not at the computer 
(1 = logged out, 0 = did not log out) 
4) Password is not written down (1 = not written down, 0 = 
written down) 
5) Participant gave in to user‘s social engineering attempt (1 = did 
not give in to social engineering attempt, 0 = did give in to social 
engineering attempt) 
Formative 
Objective 
7. Subjective norms / 
Normative beliefs  
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010) 
 (also a measure of motivation in ELM) 
Reflective 
8. Perceived 
behavioral control 
(Ajzen 2002) 
 (also a measure of ability in ELM) 
Reflective 
9. Self-efficacy  (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) 
 (also a measure of ability ELM) 
Reflective 
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10. Measures for 
motivation  
Benefit of Compliance, Intrinsic Benefit, Safety, Rewards, Cost of 
Compliance, Work Impediment, Cost of Noncompliance, Intrinsic 
cost, Vulnerability, and Sanctions (Bulgurcu et al. 2010) 
Reflective 
11. ISP awareness, 
general awareness 
(Bulgurcu et al. 2010) Reflective 
12. Data importance (Moshe and William 1999) Reflective 
13. Data sensitivity (Moshe and William 1999) Reflective 
14. Task Time The time it took to complete the task Objective 
15. Time sense 
training 
The time sense the participant took training Objective 
Discussion 
This paper moves beyond ELM to explain how security argumentation and security cues influence secure 
behavior through not only attitude change (ELM), but also by influencing cognitive load (CLT). The 
integration of these two theories allows us to challenge and expand previous research by explaining when 
security arguments and security cues, respectively, will have strong positive effects on secure behavior. 
We expect to find that when users have a poor attitude toward secure behavior, security argumentation 
will be more effective in improving secure behavior than security cues. Security cues that remind users to 
be secure should have very little utility if the user does not believe that behaving secure is worthwhile or 
important. Users will simply ignore the security cues.  Furthermore, security argumentation will have a 
stronger, enduring effect on security attitude; whereas the effect of security cues has a smaller, less 
enduring effect (Petty and Cacioppo 1981). However, when users have a positive attitude toward security, 
security cues should have a greater effect on secure behavior as mediated by cognitive load than by 
security argumentation. As security attitude is already positive, improving security attitude further would 
have minimal marginal benefit. Security cues can also augment cognition and decrease cognitive load, 
which should improve secure behavior. Security arguments require users to think (Puhakainen and 
Siponen 2010) and thus increase cognitive load, which will negatively affect secure behavior.  
This study will have salient implications for practitioners and managers of security systems. Often 
security training sessions are repeatedly administered without thinking about users’ security attitudes or 
how training influences cognitive load. This research suggests that attitude toward security and cognitive 
load should be considered before choosing what training media should be implemented in an 
organization. Two common methods for assessing security attitude include administering surveys or 
conducting interviews (Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). As previously discussed, if security attitude is 
positive, an organization would benefit from implementing security cues to decrease cognitive load; if 
security attitude is negative, an organization would benefit from implementing security arguments to 
change user attitudes. Likely, continual evaluation and thus a combination of security arguments and cues 
should be used to adapt to the changing needs of users to maximize security. 
Conclusion 
Users’ compliance with their organization’s password policy has important legal and financial 
implications. Security training can be implemented to help promote secure behavior. Past research has 
proven the efficacy of training and has suggested that training is most effective when it provides quality 
argumentation that invokes systematic processing. We build on this research by explaining how training 
in the form of security cues that promote peripheral processing influences secure behaviors and, in some 
situations, can be more effective in promoting secure behavior than security argumentation. We provide 
hypotheses that explain how both security arguments and security cues influence secure behavior through 
the mediators of security attitude and cognitive load. We then hypothesize when each type of training will 
be most effective. Finally, we suggest how this model can be tested in an experimental setting. 
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